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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

LEHI IRRIGATiiON C!O·MPANY,
Plaintiff omd A 'J!(JJellxunt,

vs.
CLARENCE T. J·ONES and ED
H. W .&TSON, State Engineer of
the State of Utah,

Case No.
7189

Defendants wnd Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT

We do not disagree with the brief opening statement
of Appellant, as far as it goes. While te-chnically, the
appeal is from the District Court, the action of the State
Engineer in granting the applications and permitting us
to try to acquire water rights, presents the controlling
question here. His findings, which are not modified or
changed by the ·Court 'below, wi1l be used as th·e basis for
our brief.
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Appellant has the burden of establishing error in
his conclusions. We will cite the record in case 14645,
as it appears to be c.omplete. It also contains some
docum·ents belonging to the files in cases 14646 and 14647.
We will c.ite pages from this record with the letter "R,"
and pages of the transcript of evidence with the letter

"T."
THE ISSUES

The only point briefed and relief upon is that the
original sour0e of the waters involved was Weber River,
and that the waters are covered by ffiings made by the
United States, through the Bureau of Reclamation, or
assigned to it. That under these, the department has the
right to, and may claim reposs·ession of the waters in-,
volved.
These filings were not admitted in evidence. And no
point of error is argued on the r-\;Iling excluding them.
Appellant makes, and appears to rely entirely upon, the
statement (P. 5), that: "The project known as the Deer
Creek Reservoir and the Weber River Irrigation System
is so well known that we think the Court will judicially
notice the same and the details with resp~ect thereto.''
We do not know as to this, or as to how far it may
go. However, it seems unnecessary to contest it at any
length.
It is true, that there is ·evidence, and a finding as to
each spring, hy the State Engineer (R. 14) that: "However, 'vith the increased application of irrigation waters
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on the higher lands and, in particular, the use of Deer
Creek waters thereon, the flow from the sp-ring has in
the past few years, materially increased so that it now
yields more "Tater than would have been availa'ble to the
protestant 'Yere it not for the increased irrigation of
upper lands.
The trial ·Court~s finding supports this (R. 26). The
Appellant claims only a diligence right to the water of
Dry ·Creek available to it prior to 1903, since which time
statutes have required that applications be made hy filing
with the State Engineer. The finding ;(R. 25) that they
have only this right and that they ''make no claim of, or
any claim under any filing since 1903, '' ie not challenged.
Thus, and by reason, of the abandonment in the Brief
of any contention that their right will be interfered with
by the g-ranting of this application, or even the perfection of a water right thereunder, they have eliminated
any such issue from the case. 'The claim here is merely
that some one foreign to the case, might hav.e objected,
or could object, to our use of the water attempted to be
filed on.
We come, therefore, to the consideration of the
single point briefed and to the question as to whether
(1) that point can be now raised here, for the first time,
or (2) raised by this Appellant at all and, if so, (3)
whether it has merit.
BRIEF AND ARGUMEN'T
General Rules Applicable:

The State Engineer's decision (R. 15) was: "FolSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lowing the rule laid down by our Supreme Court in cases
like Little Cottonwood Water Company v. Kimball, it
would appear that there is a reasonable likelihood that
the applicant can perfect this application. The application is therefore granted, subject to prior rights.''
· This is in harmony with the decisions of this Court
establishing the policy of promoting the greatest possible
use of water. Also with the decisions that the granting
of the application does not effect an ap,propriation. It
merely affords an opportunity for the Engineer to see if
proper appropriation by the applicant to a beneficial use
can he effected, without interference with objector's
rights, or subject thereto. He is charged with the duty
of general administration, the duty to bring about the
largest us·e possible, and the duty to prevent waste.
(100-2-1)

Little Cottonwood v. Kimball, 76 U 243, 289 P. 116.
Eardley v. Terry, 94 U 367, 77 P. (2) 362.
In the former case it was said that it is the duty of
the Engineer to grant the application if there ''is or
may 'be'' water available for ap,propriation.
And, in the latter case ''if there is probable cause
to believe that there is unap·propriated waters available
or waters which c:an be made av,ailable for use."
The Courj:s below and here can only determine
whether the ·sta.te Engineer rightly ap-proved the application, as against the protest of an App~ellant. And will
sustain him where he does not act ''arbitrarily or capriciously.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Eardley Y.

Terry~

Supra.

TannerY. Bacon, 103 U. at 506, 136 P. (2) at 962.
Spring Waters- Percolating:

,,. .e briefly point out the reasons for these applications covering ""'"aters arising in springs on our own land.
,,. . e are a\vare, that under the decisions of this ·Court,
reviewed in Stookey v. Green, 178 P. 586, it has been
held: ~·If it is private land and the water is percolating,
as known and understood at common law, then it is
nDt the subject of appropriation as against the owner
of the land.'' The point is now before this Court, however, in Riordan v. Westwood.
Some contention was made in the Court below, that
since \Ye apparently already had the water, we couldn't
appl~v to apropriate any part of it. The Court in effect
held that this was no concern of the Appellant. That
they would not be affected either way. This is not raised
here.
And, we are also aware, that such waters when
allowed to escape, without indication of p!resent intention of the prior irrigator to reclaim and use them, may
become subject to down stream or lower appropriations,
and to successive approp-riations. The policy is to keep
waters working.
Clark v. Nor. Cottonwood Irr. Co., 79 U 425, 11
P. (2) 300.
Smithfield W·est Bench v. Union Life, 142 P. (2)
866.
So, by placing these applications we may be a!ble to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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hold a priority on escaping waters up to the amounts
applied for, pending the completion of the expenditures
and improvements to enable us to put the same to use.
This must all be done before we can make proof for, or
complete an appropriation, or receive a certificate.
Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kent Lakes Res. Co., 140
P. (2) 6·38 at 640.
Points Argued :

I.
The point now plliesent~ed is that Appellant cannot here
for the first tim~e mise tbe claim briefed.

This Court on appeal is restricted to questions,
Issues and theories p:resented in the Court below.

U. S. Bldg. & Loan Ass 'n v. Midvale Home Fin.
Corp., 86 U 522, 46 P. (2) 672.
Huber v. Newman, 145 P. (2) 780,782.
Woolf v. Gray, 48 U. 239,

1~58

P. 788.

And, see additional cases cited in Volume 6, 406,
UCA 1943.
Appellant's protests to the State Engineer are not
in evidence. The issue presented there is, however, recited by the State Engineer (R. 14):
'' ~l_1he protest is based primarily upon the contention that all of the water from the springs in question
has been appropriated by the protestant and that there
is no unappropriated water * * *.
"But, as ·agaJinst that C~o~pany, (Appellant) it does
appear that this increased flow of the spring caused from
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

irrigation of higher lands might be unappropriated
'Yaters * * • .
··Under the case of Little Cottonwood Water Company Y. Kimball, ·76 U. 243, and other similar cases, the
State Engineer should approve an application, if there
is reasonable ground for 'be1ieving that the applicant
might he able to perfect a right.''
It "i.ll be noticed that the State Engineer determined
the matter d as against" Appellant and as between the
parties to the then claimed conflict.
_A._ppellant's complaint (R. 1) alleges its ownership
of all 'Yater of Dry Creek and all its springs and sources
of supply. It then pleads that there is no unappropriated waters in any contributory springs or within th·e
area of the application, because it a11 belongs to it, because such ''have been, and now are put to a beneficial
use by Appellant herein." They pray ('R. 3) that their
said rights be decreed to be "prior and superior to any
claims and demands of the Defendant.'' ''Pleadings,
practice and procedure'' in this case are the same as in
equity cases generally. (100-3-15). Thus any claim, as
to unappropriated waters, was based upon the claim,
that there are none such because the waters involved
belong to Appellant.
We offered some evidence to show additional irrigation on the bench land above by respondent and others
through the Provo Res. Canal System, com1nencing- when
that canal was build in 1913. (T. 27.) There "\Vas some
testilnony that prior to and during and since 1944 there
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
had been increased irrigation up there, main1y by the
use of water from Weber River, and an additional increase in the springs. (T. 68-72.)
~rhere

is no allegation as to any right of the Vnited
States Reclamation Department to this water, or any
claim that it isn't subject to our filing, by reason of the
fact that that Department might have the intention of
some time recovering it. And nothing as to Respondent's reliance thereon.
The State Engineer found: ''These waters have
escaped the original appropriators and have returned to
a natural water channel and issue in the form of
springs.'' ·There is no claim that their re-use by the Department would add to Appellant's water supply.
II.
Thl's point is that Appellant cannot be heard here at
all on ·the .claim briefed, that the Reclamation Department
might reclaim and re-use the water involved.
It would se~to be elementary that one water user
It
cannot be heard to object because somebody is using or
is attempting to appropriate for us·e water which may
be claimed by a third party. We wil'l show that even
an owner of right to water cannot object to its use by
ap.other unless he is ready and able to put it to a beneficial uge himself.
Appellant's point is that prior filings by, and the
right or the possibility of the Department repossessing
these waters for re-us·e make them unappropriated
waters, as to its claim. ·''Approp·ria tion'' and ' 'una pSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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propriated'' are ter1ns of very uncertain m·eaning and
application.
\Y"eil v\T ater Rights, page 304.
\\~rathall

v. Johnson, 86 U. 50, 40 P. (2) 755, held that
in addition to the application for use and intent, appropriation requires the actual diversion and the a pplica.tion
to a useful and beneficial purpose.
It is certain that the filing of an application and its
approval is not an appropriation, whether this is accomplished 'by the Reclamation Department, or 'by the respondent.
Duchesne Co. v. Humphreys, 106 U 382, 148 P. (2)
338, 339.
Des. Livestock Co. v. Hooppiania, 66 U. 25, 23'9 P.
479, and the cases cited above.
In any event the actual or anticipated claims of
strangers cannot affect the result here.
Weil Water Right, 3d. ed., Page 682.
"627: Nor COIYIJ Rights of St11arng0rs Affect theResult Between the Parties Litigant.-N ot being hound nor
before the court at all, the rights of strangers correspondingly cannot affect the suit; it must be determined
upon the relative rights alone of those before the court.
It cannot avail one party to say that some stranger to
the suit has a better right than his op·ponent. !The supreine court of the United States has said: 'Neither do
we think that the trial court was called upon, at the
instance of the defendants, entire strangers in every
aspect to other appropriators, to inquire into and pass
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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upon the question whether appropriators of water below
the mouth of the proposed canal would be injured by the
construction of the canal. 'The rights of such persons
will not, of course, he injuriously affected by the decree in this caus-e, and non oonst~at but that they may
yet intervene for their own protection, if they deem that
the construction of the canal will be an invasion of their
rights, or that they may be willing to forego objection
to the construction of the canal.' ''
'The eases cited indicate that this rule applies here
and in any similar situation. It would seem to apply
with greater reason, wher·e only the initiation of a right
is involved, and where the Departm·ent may make its own
objection, if it has one. This use may be favored by it.
See also St. George & Washington Canal v.
Hurricane Co., 93 U. 262, 72 P. (2) 642, at 647,
par. 7.
Page 679 (3d ed.) same author.
''6'25: Castes Are Gove.rned by the Relative Rights
of the P,arties Before the Cou.rt.-It is a general principle of law that the court can determine the rights only
of the parties to the suit, and only as between themselves.
They may both he wrongdoers as against a third person,
yet that third person may never set up his right against
either of them. It is the office of the court to adjudge
only the relative right! in actual controversy of th~e
plaintiffs against the defendants and vice versa. * * •
It is too o'bvious to require elaboration that the parties
to a lawsuit must fight it out between themselves, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at the ~nine tiine its re~nlt~ affect them alone.''
A party, \Yho i~ ~eeking to appropriate water, may
do so as against a third party's objection to the appropriation, eYen though he is a tte1npting to do it by the
nse of the ditches and over the lands of a third party
\Yi thou.f the party ·s consent.
\Veil \\' ater Rights, 3rd ed., Page 421.

The san1e author at pag·e 504 says:
'\Vhen the appropriator is no longer using the
\Yater either for the season or any specific time, his right
to cut off or interfere with the flow of the stream for the
time being lapse1.' * * *
'' 'And the owner not requiring its use should not
be permitted to complain of its application to a beneficial
use by others interested. In other words. at all times
that the water is not required by one or more, it must
be at the disposal of others in the order of their relative
rights thereto.' In an oft-cited opinion by Judge Hawley it is said: 'In the appropriation of water, there cannot he any ''dog in the manger'' business by either
party, to interfere with the rights of others, when no
beneficial use of the water is or can be made by the party
causing such interference.' The same case holds that
waste in the use of water is not permissible. * * *
d

''Water codes usually contain the provision ''beneficial use ~hall be the basis, the measure and the limit of
the right.' And statutes generally enact the same rule
in other forms.''
It would seem too absurd to ask this Court on this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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record to determine this appeal on anything with reference to any claim on any filing relating to Deer Creek.
It is clear that A·ppellant has not the slightest possible
interest in whether this respondent may complete an
appropriation on the water covered by the applications,
or on any part of it.
'1'
The following Utah Water Cases bear on this point:
Mt. Olivet ·Cemetery v. S. L. City, 65 U. 1'93, 235
P. 876, 879.
Sigurd City v. State, 105 U. 278, 142 P. (2) 154,
157, Par. 1.
If appellant now desires to proceed, as he does, entirely on the ground that some third party owns this
water, then appellant has no right to have the courts
review the action of the State Engineer.
Section 100-3-14 provides for a review of the
State Engineer's decision. This section gives a
right of r·eview in the courts to "any person aggrieved by such decision.'' On the only theory of
the appellant, appel'lant has not been aggrieved.

III.
This point is that the authority cit·ed does not apply
here, and does not sustain Ap,ellant's contention.

In connection with the previous point, it will be
noted that in the case cited by Appellant, and in those
cited therein, the party seeking to repossess the waters
is the immediate owner of the right involved and asserted.
Also, that there, the proceedings were not on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mere Inatter of approval of an application to appropriate waters, but on established rights of plaintiffs which
embraced the right purpose and intent to re-capture and
use the \Yaters involved. The filings on the W eher River
by the Department for storage at Deer ·Creek have no
inti1na~ion of purpose to re-capture, and there is before
the Court no intimation of this, or of any, conflict bet,veen it and the respondent.
..

The State Engineer's order approved respondent's
applications "subject to prior rights". fl,e suggests no
conflict between the Department and the applicant. As
stated above, there was no issue on this. He does suggest a possible claim by Utah Lake appropriators, as
being a •'more serious question'' ( R. 1,5), which, he says,
if presented, he would be called upon to answer. He
refers to the ".,.aters here involved as waters, "which
have been allowed to escape the control of the original
appropriators", and says there "is at least reasonable
doubt'' that these "are still unappropriated waters".
And, concludes that there is a ''reasonable likelihood''
[probability] that the applicant can p·erfect an appropriation.
It can't be assumed as probable that the Reclamation Department will ever attempt to repossess, or assert
any claim of right to repossess, the waters here involved. If they should, all that can be said, is that
Respondent may. not be able to ~omplete his appropriation as to some of the waters sought. This is the si tuation on all applications to approp,riate, but this does not
seem to be ground for denial.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On this see: Rocky Ford v. Kent's Lake, 135
P. (2) 108 and particularly paragraph" 5-7'' page
113.
In any event, the right to apply to beneficial use
the waters of the State cannot be left indefinitely to
dangle because some disinterested person may i~timate
that som·eone, somewhere, sometime, might claim a right
therein.
•
The case of Ide v. U. S. cited (7) by Appellant is
quit·e distinguishable. It does not involve this matter of
mere approval of an application, so as to permit an
attempted appropriation. We have already pointed out
a difference, in that, the parties there were prosecuting
their own claims.
We will now point out some other distinguishing features. The opinion shows that there the Government
acquired the ownership and control of the use of all
the waters involved and also the ownership and control
of all the lands in the project, except one school section.
This was sold by the State to the Defendants.
!The Government was engaged in constructing its
storage reservoir and in selling tracts of land, and with
each tract, a project water right to use water enough
to irrigate it. The project was not yet completed. It
was pointed out that hy the act and under all the arrangem·ents re-use of the water was contemplated and
necessary, in order to have sufficient water to supply
the us·ers on all the project lands. That the Government
never abandoned or allowed the waters involved to escape, but as soon as sufficient waters seeped into the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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raYine fron1 the first diYision of the project to 1nake a
flo"·, it took in1n1ediate steps to repossess it. It \vas
the construction of the channel to carry this water that
brought on the conflict.
The Court there was not dealing with State supervision pr 'Yith the discretion of the statutory administrator of public 'vaters. The whole of the prop~erties,
including the "·aters and lands of the project, had been
taken, together, over and into Federal ownership and
control. The case simply held that under the particular
facts and circumstances involved, the Government was
not precluded from re-capture and re-use of its waters.
There is no record here on which that case, under
those facts, can be given any application to this one .
. A.nd if this Court may take judicial knowledge, of facts
with relation to Deer Creek, it will see that the en tire
situatio~, as well as the nature of the proceedings, are
different.
We will state from our knowledge, after some experience with Deer Creek, some of the facts involved in
this situation. The Government did acquire filings for
approp-riation of Weber River waters for storage at
Deer Creek. And, it entered into a contract with Provo
River Water Users Association, a Utah Corporation, to
advance money to it to construct the reservoir, - the
money so advanced to be re-paid by the latter, upon
'vhich re-payment the Government is to release to it all
interests in the project including the filings. The Government owns and controls no lands to be irrigated. It
does not distribute or regulate or control the distribuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion of any waters to the irrigators.
Users buy stock in the Association, and in the case
of use for irrigation, and in the instance which we have
her·e, the irrigators form another and separate Irrigation District association. It buys the stock, and then its
members in turn subscribe for shares in it, to meet their
needs. The water is largely, if not entirely, used for
supplemental irrigation, and not for r·eclamation,of new
'lands.
The water in this bench irrigation district is diverted
from Provo River through the Provo Reservoir Canal.
This diversion and canal ha¥e been there since 1913,
but by enlargem·ent since about 1940, additional water
has been diverted and used over an upper area of about
fifteen miles in length, and of varying widths. It is
diverted from the canal hy ditches and carried as high
up toward the foothills as possible and, of course, the
return flow is taken out below again and re-used. Some
of it, thus, comes finally to the applicant who had used
it on his upper lands for four years (T. 13) prior to the
trial.
Now, having in mind the Appellant's case Ide v.
u. s., s:upra, and the quotation therein from a similar
case, that even under those circumstances, and as to
the repossession by the owner: "It is requisite, of course,
that he be able to identify it" as his water. Let us compare what we have her.
Water under filings held by the Government, at least
as security, is turned from the Weber to the Provo and
mingled with its waters. Water released from storage
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there is diverted by the first Association to the District
~\.ssoriation and distributed by it to users, as above
stated, and the return flo,Ys repeatedly re-used. Finally,
the R.espondent, "~ho has aequired enough shares to
double the irrigation of his land (T. 13) applies it on
his 12~, acres CT. 9). This extends directly above and
along the full length of the area in which the spring
flo"~s arise (T. 14). The total water used above by him
•
would clearly exeeed the total sought ·by these applications.
Applications of this kind are properly approved on
the "probability" that the applicant might 'be able to
complete an appropriation to part, at least, of th·e waters
involved. This Court has used the term "probability"
in this connection many times.
Is it then '' eap,tious'' on the part of the Engineer,
to assume it improbable that th·e holder of the Deer
Creek filings will later claim the right to repossess, and
attempt to repossess for use by it, this small amount of
water so arising on Respondent's own land and which
has escaped there for more than four years~ Is it probable that such holder would attempt an identification
or segregation of such higher supp~lem·ental irrigation
users' waters, and these spring flows therefrom back
to 1913~
Are they going back in this manner as to each individual user to trace out such probable escap·ed waters,
or could they practically, or legally, do so~ It is not
probable.
It would not seem necessary to pursue this distincSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion or this inquiry at any greater length. It would seem
to us much more probable, under the Utah decisions,
that if such waters could be identified or repossessed,
it would have to be by the individual users, and alone
in connection with the immediate irrigation on their
lands. And it appears they would have to act pcomptly
enough to show an intention not to abandon or treat as
escaped water, that which might have left and aris.en elsewhere as seepage. And the principal right to so repossess here is in the Respondent, if anywhere. The Government has, and has indicated, no inter~est in it.
OONCLUSI~ON

Without repetition, it seems clear, that Appellant
is asserting no interest by it in the waters sought by
respondent's applications, and is claiming no possible
interfer·ence with its rights by the order, or by the judgment appealed from.
As an academic matter only, it has suggested that
a possible claim by another, who is neither a protestant
or a party, may render some portions of the waters
sought unavailable. On the record here, the authority
cited to support this, their third party claim, can be
given no application or effect; and if it could, it is
clearly distinguishable as to the nature of action, and
on its facts.
That the only claim relied upon here is not available to Appellant, as it has no interest therein and could
not be a party thereto, and is in no way affected thereby.
That the theory of the claim relied upon and the
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issued tenderd on appeal, is not available because not
raised or presented for decision in the lower Court.
From \Yhich it would seem to follow that the judgment of the trial Court should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. CLYDE, and
MULLIN·ER, PRINC'E & MULLIN·ER
Attorneys for Respondents.
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